Conflict and competition for Syrian wealth between Iran and Russia: phosphate as an example.

Conflict and competition for Syrian wealth between Iran and Russia: phosphate as an example.

Phosphate is considered an important national treasure of Syria, which has allowed it to top the list of resources that could compensate Russia and Iran for the cost of their support for the survival of President Assad's regime. In addition, it is rich in uranium and ores, the possibility of using it for military purposes, which increases the competition between the two countries for the capture of its reserves.
On March 27, 2018, the Syrian National Assembly approved contract No. (66) between the Main Institute of Geology and Mineral Resources of the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum, on the one hand, and the Russian company Stroy Trans Gaz, on the other hand, which provides that the latter is granted the right to invest and extract phosphates in the Sharqiya mine area (45 km to southwest of Palmyra)
Within the sector, where proven reserves amount to 105 million tons, and according to the contract, the Syrian side's share is only 30% of production, plus 2% as compensation for the cost of land rent, licenses, supervision, expenses, taxes and other fees. Production will be in the amount of 2.2 million tons annually for fifty years, i.e. until the entire reserve is used up in this industry.
This contract is considered an example of the Syrian regime using Syrian resources and wealth as a means to pay off its debts to its allies (Russia and Iran) by distributing them in the form of long-term investment contracts and on unfair terms towards Syria. after the progress he has made helping them on the ground and tilting the military balance in his favor in the conflict at the expense of the opposition, especially in 2017
This contract is also considered to be a continuation of Moscow's dominance over energy investments in Syria. at the expense of Tehran.
The company considered Syrian phosphates as part of its stake in Syria to offset the costs it incurred in supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. In early 2017, Iran received promises from the Syrian regime to repay its loans (credit lines) by creating a joint company between the two sides that will control the extraction of Syrian phosphates.
And export it through Tehran. Accordingly, this study aims to discuss the implications of this contract as a model for the long-term squandering of Syrian wealth, on the one hand, and as a prelude to conflicts that may unfold in the future between the regime's allies over the acquisition of resources and economic hegemony over Syria, especially as the end of hostilities in Syria approaches and what this leads to. It may lead to the collapse of the Russian-Iranian alliance in Syria.
First: Syrian phosphate as an economic resource
Until 2011, Syria was ranked fifth in the world in the list of phosphate exporting countries. And this is despite the development that has taken place in the field of exploration and production.
However, it is still below the required level in terms of research, exploration, production, production and exports. Reliable reserves are estimated at two billion tons, but production volumes are still less than 3.5 million tons of phosphate ore per year. Syria is divided into the following territories
1- Palmyrena series (Khnaifis, Sharqiya and Ar-Rahim).

2- Al-Hammad district (Al-Jifafa, Al-Talatawat, Al-Sijri and Al-Khabara).

3- Coastal region (Ain Lilun, Ain el Tineh, Qalat al-Mahalaba and Hammam al-Karakhla)
Palmyra series mines, especially Hunaifis and Sharqiya, are considered the most important and economically advantageous reservoirs in terms of phosphate layer thickness, which ranges from 10-12 meters and can reach 20 meters per day. in the Sharkia region, and in terms of type; The percentage of phosphorus pentoxide in it is 28-34%, while the extracted phosphate from other points does not exceed 18-22%.
A - Khneifis Mines: located on the Damascus road/Palmyra, 75 km south of Palmyra, and contains two mines (north and south). In practice, mining at the yuzhny mine was stopped after the extraction of most of the suitable ore from both farms. As for the remaining reserves of the Northern Mine, they are considered small and do not exceed 24 million tons.
B - Al-Sharqiya Mines (As-Sawwana): They are located 30 km northeast of the Khanaifis area, to the right of the Damascus road./Palmyra, only about 5 km away. There are two mining areas (A-B). The Al-Sharqiya mines are considered the most important of all in Syria in terms of major reserves, estimated at 1.8 billion tons.
According to the proximity of the phosphates extracted from it to international standards; Phosphate of the sixth class is extracted at the Sharkia mines, and phosphate of Hunaifis is phosphate of the eighth class and is processed to produce phosphate of the fourth class in accordance with international specifications.
Despite the large phosphate reserves at the Sharqiya and Hunaifis mines, however, Syria's mining capacity is generally considered low. At its peak in 2006 and 2010, it reached about 3.5 million tons, which means that it did not exceed 0.17% of the reserve.
Syrian phosphate is considered to be one of the species rich in radioactive uranium. This had a major impact on phosphate exports from Syria in the 1990s, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the largest importer at the time. Syrian phosphate exports have declined.
The Syrian regime's evasiveness towards Tehran in converting economic promises and memoranda of understanding between them into real contracts and projects and transferring vital sectors of the economy to Moscow reflects the regime's greater inclination towards Moscow. This can be explained by his unwillingness to further get involved in an alliance with Tehran.
Moscow is seeking to seize Syrian economic resources under long-term contract formulas and on terms that are unfair to the Syrian side. It represents Moscow's desire to ensure that the costs of supporting the regime are reimbursed in any possible scenario of its fate, including the possibility of its overthrow as part of a certain deal. Therefore, it seems that Moscow wants to repay its debts through economic projects approved by the Syrian People's Assembly.
Today, we can say that Syria is subject to Russian influence. Moscow has applied its full political, military and economic dominance over the territories controlled by the Syrian regime, and this will give it the opportunity to negotiate with the West in the light of any negotiations on the form of a political solution. Therefore, she won't accept any of them. a form of solution that could deprive him of the economic benefits of the Assad regime in Syria. Consequently, the American presence in eastern Syria and the oil and gas resources located in the zones of this presence. They represent a security factor for the Syrian opposition, despite the fact that these resources and capabilities will the Syrian opposition benefit from them in the future,
Today, China has a great opportunity to turn over the cards, as Russia is mired in the quagmire of Ukraine and after the assassination of Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner militia, where his forces and people defended, mined and exported phosphates.
She sells him and benefits from his money.
Iran's capabilities have weakened
The arrival of Trump and his positions hostile to Iran's policy in the region and in Syria, as well as after painful Israeli strikes against the Iranian forces and their allied militias that occupied the eastern region of Syria, as it neighbors Iraq, and put pressure on the Kurds.
China will take advantage of the opportunities
He will support Russia politically, media, and militarily.
To obtain some concessions from Russia in the Syrian desert bordering Iraq and Iraq's access to the Mediterranean Sea.
Build your own economic project and a new Silk Road.
China has also sought to restore bridges of trust and relations between Iran and the Saudi-led Gulf group, as well as pressure Israel to mitigate the expected military strike, as well as pressure Turkey not to return Uighur mercenaries belonging to Iran. to join the Turkestan army in China or Tajikistan.

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