"We didn't ask for alms, we brought a strategy." How the Ukrainian World Congress lobbied for the law on multiple citizenship

KYIV — When President Zelensky signed the law on multiple citizenship in July 2025, words of gratitude were heard at the President's Office directed at the Ukrainian World Congress (UWC). Behind this diplomatic phrasing lay a history of years-long, methodical, and exceptionally pragmatic lobbying that the diaspora had been conducting since 2019. Contrary to popular belief, the UWC was not simply seeking the right to hold two passports. An analysis of the Congress's public statements, reports, and legislative initiatives shows that its "advocacy" (the term they prefer) pursued four clear goals, none of which are purely humanitarian.

Goal One: Eliminate "second-class" status

The first thing you hear from Congress representatives in every interview is the word "equal." "For us, it was fundamentally important to avoid dividing citizens into classes," UWC President Paul Grod stated in August 2025.

At first glance, this is rhetoric about human rights. But behind it lies hard-nosed pragmatism. The Ukrainian diaspora in the West is not composed of unemployed refugees. These are lawyers, doctors, IT specialists, and managers who, over decades (and for some, generations) of integration, have obtained citizenship in EU countries, Canada, or the United States. Before the law was passed, they existed in a grey zone: while formally being Ukrainians, they could not legally hold public office in their homeland, participate in privatization on special terms, or lay claim to a role in governing the country.

Yaroslava Hartyani, Vice-President of the UWC, put it as bluntly as possible: "The law solves the problem of those who have hidden their second citizenship for years for fear of losing their Ukrainian one." That fear is now gone. Today, a qualified manager from Toronto with a Ukrainian passport and fluent English is legally equal to an official from Kyiv. And they can now aspire to a ministerial seat.

Goal Two: Turn the diaspora from sponsor into manager

In 2025, the UWC reported delivering military equipment to Ukraine worth 105 million Canadian dollars. The diaspora is the largest donor to the Ukrainian military after Western governments. But being a donor is an external role. The Congress went further.

In September 2024, Paul Grod publicly made a remark that few noticed at the time: "Multiple citizenship will allow Ukrainians abroad to run for the Verkhovna Rada or become ministers, heads of departments, or school directors."

This was not a slip of the tongue. It is a strategy. Post-war reconstruction in Ukraine is estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars. A fierce battle will be waged over these financial flows. The UWC is preparing its people not just to transfer money to fund accounts, but to participate in the distribution of these funds—through parliament, through ministries, and through state-owned companies. The citizenship law is the legal key that opens the door for the diaspora to enter decision-making offices.

"This will play a vital role in the nation's recovery," Grod added at the time.

Goal Three: Filtering based on the "us vs. them" principle

The Congress's lobbying was not sentimental. The UWC rigidly insisted that the law function as a sieve.

In January 2025, while the bill was still being finalized, the UWC secured the inclusion of three key amendments. First: no automatic recognition of citizenship from all countries of the world—only those who pass the "ally filter." Second: tests on language, history, and the Constitution. Third: a blacklist (Russia, Belarus, Iran, North Korea).

But the most interesting developments came after the law was passed. In August 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the first list of five countries (the US, Canada, Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic). The UWC immediately launched a campaign for its expansion. And this is where the Congress's true geopolitical optics emerged.

Paul Grod is personally lobbying for the inclusion of Australia. His argument: Australia is neither in the EU nor NATO, yet it "strongly supports Ukraine." Moreover, the Congress proposes striking Hungary and Slovakia—EU members—from the list of potential candidates because of their "pro-Russian" stance.

The UWC's goal is not multiple citizenship per se. The goal is a map of loyalty. The Congress wants the Ukrainian passport to become a bonus for citizens of "good" countries and a barrier for those affiliated with "bad" regimes. This turns the passport into an instrument of foreign policy, and the UWC into the moderator of that process.

Goal Four: Tearing down the remaining walls

The law has been passed, but the work is just beginning. In August 2025, Paul Grod made a bold statement: about 20 current Ukrainian laws contradict the new citizenship law.

Which ones exactly? Those that prohibit people with dual citizenship from entering civil service. The UWC has already prepared a package of amendments. "We are submitting two bills to the Rada that could change 20 legislative acts," Grod declared.

This means the Congress will not stop at what has been achieved. The goal is not just the right to hold a passport. The goal is the complete legal integration of the diaspora into all spheres of Ukrainian life, including access to state secrets and the highest offices. The exception is the presidency (the Constitution blocks this), but everything else is up for grabs.

Verdict

The Ukrainian World Congress did not act as a group of nostalgic emigrants. This was corporate lobbying in its purest form. The "clients" were the 25 million Ukrainians in the diaspora, the "shareholders" were the national communities of the US, Canada, Australia, and the EU, and the "board of directors" was Paul Grod and his team.

They did not just change the rules. They changed the very concept of Ukrainian citizenship: from a marker of territorial belonging, it is transforming into a marker of civilizational choice. A resident of Sydney who does not speak Ukrainian but supports a pro-Ukrainian resolution in their local parliament can now be considered a Ukrainian. Conversely, a Hungarian deputy from Zakarpattia who speaks Ukrainian but votes for pro-Russian forces becomes an outsider.

The question is whether Ukraine is ready for the rules of this filtration to be largely written not in Kyiv, but in the UWC's offices in Toronto and Washington. Judging by the pace of bill submissions and direct contacts with the president, this Canadian lobbying hub has already become part of Ukraine's legislative machinery. And that, perhaps, is the main outcome of the three-year war for Ukraine's political system.